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и тем самым каллиграфия принимает важное религиозное зна-
чение: фактически искусство письма в исламе сакрализуется. Это 
можно вывести также и из того, что искусство каллиграфии сфор-
мировалось благодаря составлению и записи единого Корана.
Таким образом, можно сделать вывод, что запрет на изобра-
зительное искусство, выведенный из Корана и объясненный 
знатоками шариата, пресек развитие мусульманского изобрази-
тельного искусства (в первую очередь живописи и скульптуры). 
Но, вместе с тем, колоссальное значение в исламском искусстве 
принимают каллиграфия и архитектура. Фактически каллигра-
фия берет на себя функцию изобразительного искусства, она по-
глощает его: в связи с запретом на изображение людей, особенно 
пророка Мухаммада, только каллиграфия может передать некий 
зрительный образ пророка (о словесных описаниях, сделанных 
его современниками, здесь речь не идет), который может ис-
пользоваться в убранстве мечети, книгах или в домах верующих. 
Каллиграфия также играет большую роль в украшении мечети 
наравне с коврами и орнаментом, фактически приобретая са-
кральное значение.
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Human is entirely a God's creation from the theological point of 
view. It is a weak creature which aims at getting into the Paradise 
(ğanna) and avoiding the inferno (ğahannam). A man got a power of 
naming the animals, rational thinking, distinguishing goodness and 
badness, capability to make a choice between them1. A man rules the 
world in behalf of God. Is a man prepared to accomplish the mission 
given to him? In the Islamic theology, the angels tried to put God up to 
not entrust this mission to a man because of his weaknesses. Islamic 
thinkers stumble across the issue of predestination and badness. On 
the one hand, one part of Quranic message seems to indicate that 
a man is a free-will being, equipped with responsibility and able to 
1 Wąs, A. Człowiek w islamie. Antropologia teocentryczna, [in.] / 
A. Wąs; G. Kucza, G. Wita (red.), Antropologia miejscem spotkania i dialogu 
międzyreligijnego, Katowice:Księgarnia św. – Jacka, 2008. – Р. 88.
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follow God's path. On the other hand, there are Quranic verses seems 
to say that human actions are determined totally by God1.
The Sharia Law marks the line for moral behavior for Muslims. The 
specialists in the interpretation of this law are called the muftis. They 
are people who make a law opinions for believers. It is necessary to 
stress that the fatwas have not a normative character in Sunni Islam 
but a consultative. They are mandatory for Shia Muslims but valid until 
the death of Shia mujtaheed (’muğtahid) who gave them2.
The Quran, the main source of law in Islam, controlled the life of the 
umma, the Muslim community, in the beginning of its existence. On the 
other hand, the Quran does not broach a lot of problems like ethical 
problems caused by technological development.
In the 8th century Islamic scholars decided to look for indications on 
making law in the Sunnah, a collection of transmissions about life of the 
Prophet. The Sunnah is the second most important part of law in Islam. 
Presently, four schools of law, the mazhabs, could be distinguished in 
Sunni Islam: (1) shafiite, (2) hanbali, (3) malic and (4) hanafite. Every 
believer is able to choose one of them according to his world-view. If 
mufti's fatwas are not acceptable for him, he is able to change his law 
school affiliation. These days, there is a permission to consolidate the 
rules descended from different mazhabs (talfiq). The most important 
difference between the mazhabs is an attitude to the sources of law. 
All of them are agreed that the Quran is unquestionable basis but they 
differentiate from each other by the methods of executing the law3.
The Islamic discuss on moral value of human actions is strictly 
connected to the problem of God's omnipotence which could be 
formulated in that way: how to square the omnipotence of God with 
human freedom of action? This problem is also known in Western 
philosophical tradition but has another context.
Mu'tazilla's doctrine claims that every human being is free in 
its action, what is connected to moral responsibility in Islam. The 
Mutazillis maintain that this freedom is a logical result of the adl – the 
God's fairness. If a man has not freedom of actions that means that 
God is not fair. The last thesis is not acceptable. The other argument 
for that is a derivative of Islamic eschatology – human freedom is 
1 Ibid. – Р. 90–91.
2 Danecki, J. Podstawowe wiadomości o islamie / J. Danecki. – Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, 20072. – Р. 218–219.
3 Ibid. – Р. 212.
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the only rational explanation of the existence of the Paradise and the 
Gehenna1.
There are some ayas, the verses in the Quran which broach the issue 
of God's omniscience:
[59] And with Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows them 
except Him. And He knows what is on the land and in the sea. Not a leaf 
falls but that He knows it. And no grain is there within the darknesses 
of the earth and no moist or dry [thing] but that it is [written] in a clear 
record.
(Q VI : 592).
If a human has freedom of action, how to reconcile this clam with 
a thesis that God knows human's every move before it is done? The 
Mu'tazilis answer that question in the following way: the God's will 
(māshāʼallāh) refers to a human in a metaphysical sense – as to the being 
– not to an act. The human actions do not mean the God's acts of will 
(irada) nor his orders (amr) but his eternal intent and creative genius.
A human is free in his act. According to this, in mu'tazilis theory the 
principles of God's threat (wad) and God's fairness (wa'id) are being 
accomplished. If a man is obedient, he is prized. Moral warrant (al-amr 
bi-al-maruf), according to mu'tazilis, refers not only to an individual 
but to whole Muslim community. It means that umma has an obligation 
to make proper living conditions possible for every Muslim3.
The Mu'tazili school gave the beginning for another philosophical 
school: The Asharits, founded by Abu al-Hasan Ali Ibn Isma'il al-Ashari 
(873–935). In the matter of human freedom al-Ashari has rejected 
the principle of human's creative power (qudra). He concerned it 
as dangerous for God's creative power and possibility of making 
polytheism (the shirk).
In Ashari's attitude called 'occasionalism', the connection between 
the cause of action, a human, and a result of action – an act – is an illusion. 
No one but God has an eternal power (qudra qadīma) which everything 
makes into existence. A man does not have a power like this4.
1 Corbin, Н. Historia filozofii muzułmańskiej, trans. K. Pachniak / H. Cor-
bin. – Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, 2009. – Р. 103.
2 The Noble Quran [Electronic resurse] / Mode of access: http://quran.
com/6. – Date of acess: 15.02.2015.
3 Ibid. – Р. 104–105.
4 Shihadeh, A. The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī / А. Shiha-
deh. – Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2006. – Р. 14.
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Instead of this, Ashari has introduced a concept of kasb. This idea 
is an interesting solution for the problem of human freedom and his 
moral responsibility for actions. Kasb means, literally, 'the acquiring'. 
According to Ashari, it means that a man has no creative power but 'the 
acquiring power' of everything what God introduced into existence.
Al-Bāqillāni adds being obedient (tā'a) or disobedient (ma'sḥiya) is 
all what a human can do, from the metaphysical point of view. Ashari 
rejected this thesis1. Regardless of the choice made by a man – being 
obedient or disobedient – God creates the effect of that choice so He's 
the main perpetrator (mu'aththir) in a metaphysical sense but not 
moral. Therefore it is possible to accept the claim on God's creative 
power and human's moral responsibility for actions.
According to another Ashari'ite scholar, Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, a 
human act is a result of combination of human's and God's power2. In 
his view, the human power can not create anything without God's help 
(mu'īn). If both are united, then an action happens.
The theory of kasb, regardless of its variations, is still the most 
popular solution of the problem between human freedom of act and 
his moral responsibility in Islamic thought.
Al-Razi is one of the most interesting Islamic philosophers because 
he is the first who combined two opposite strands of Islam: kalam – 
speculative theology and falsafa – Islamic philosophy based of Greek 
scriptures. Although al-Ghazali was the first who met those two 
streams, al-Razi was the first who made a synthesis of them3.
The main problem broached by al-Razi was the question: is a man-
perpetrator determined (mujbar) or he has a free choice (mukhtār)? 
Al-Razi rejects the mu'tazilis thesis, that a man is not determined by 
God. Al-Razi's theory claims that an action happens when human's 
creative power arise together with a motivation. If so, a motivation for 
action relies on a previous motivation. Finally, all motivations rely on 
the first motivation made by God4. If so, a man is determined in action 
and has no freedom of choice.
1 Shihadeh, A. The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī / А. Shiha-
deh. – Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2006. – Р. 15.
2 Ibid. – P. 15–16.
3Ibid. – P. 1.
4Ibid. – P. 29.
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Al-Razi argues also that all cognitive states of a man are determined 
both by internal and external factors. He singles out the following 
internal factors: (1) the differences between the quiddities of human 
souls, (2) the differences in temperance, (3) a physiognomical 
differences between people. The external factors are: (1) the place 
of living, (2) the expectations of benefits or damages caused by the 
commitment to beliefs, (3) theoretical exercises. These factors shape 
a character, the external factors shape needs and motives1. All of them, 
both external and internal, are independent of human's control so 
a man relies on them.
Nowadays, two main philosophical streams could be distinguished 
in Islam. The first, conservative, is represented by Ismail al-Faruqi. Al-
Faruqi (1921–1986) is a Palestinian scholar, studied in Harvard, McGill 
and al-Azhar. He claims that every human is equipped with special 
sense called dīn al-fitrah. Thanks to that, a man is able to recognize 
his Creator and the religion, the one religion given to the humani-
ty – Islam. In his view, human freedom is reflected in his possibility of 
coming back to God's path2.
The second strand, the modern, is promoted by Mohamed Talbi. 
Talbi is a Tunisian scholar, studied in Paris-Sorbonne. He maintains 
that freedom of action is the basis of human nature, what is, according 
to him, indicated in the Quran:
[256] There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. 
The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever 
disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most 
trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and 
Knowing (Q II : 256).
In the verse above there is not compulsion in the religious sphere 
of life. That leads up to the conclusion that freedom is a metaphysical 
feature of human being.
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Проблема судьбы в мировоззренческом плане может быть про-
читана как вопрос о границах, в пределах которых человек спосо-
1 Shihadeh, A. The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī / А. Shiha-
deh. – Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2006. – Р. 31.
2 Wąs, A. – Idem, 365.
